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Prerequisites for an evolutionary stance on the
neurobiology of language
Peter Hagoort
The neurobiology of language has to specify the cognitive
architecture of complex language functions such as speaking
and comprehending language, and, in addition, how these
functions are mapped onto the underlying anatomical and
physiological building blocks of the brain (the neural
architecture). Here it is argued that the constraints provided by
the classical anatomical measures (cytoarchitectonics and
myeloarchitectonics) are in our current understanding only very
loose constraints for detailed specifications of cognitive
functions, including language learning and language
processing. However, measures of the computational features
of brain tissue might provide stronger constraints. For
understanding cognitive specialization, for the time being we
thus have to put our cards on measures of functional instead of
structural neuroanatomy. The implication for an evolutionary
stance on the neurobiology of language is that in a cross-
species comparative perspective one needs to identify the
factors that gave rise to the properties of the canonical
microcircuits in the neocortex, and to the large scale network
organization that created the language-readiness of the human
brain.
Address
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Donders Institute for Brain,
Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9101, 6500 HB
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Corresponding author: Hagoort, Peter (peter.hagoort@donders.ru.nl)
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 21:191–194
This review comes from a themed issue on The evolution of language
Edited by Christopher Petkov and William Marslen-Wilson
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial
Available online 19th June 2018
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.05.012
2352-1546/ã 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Dobzhanski’s famous claim [1] that nothing makes sense
in biology except in the light of evolution does not hold
necessarily for the neurobiology of higher cognitive
functions such as language. No doubt both brain and
language are the product of an evolutionary history. But
for the current state of the art in the neurobiology of
language, the insights from evolutionary accounts on the
origin of language are not (yet) precise enough to be of
tremendous help. Moreover, there is a very long and
complex to-do list for the neurobiologists with an inter-
est in language that can guide the research agenda
without a clear role for constraints from evolutionary
biology. Although Dobzhanski’s claim is undoubtedly
correct in the ontological sense, for the time being its
epistemological status is less clear. I will illustrate this for
alternative views on the neuroanatomical basis of
language-relevant computations.
The research agenda of the neurobiology of language has
at least three key issues that need to be addressed. The
first one is a decomposition of the tripartite architecture
of language [2] in its core components. This entails a
detailed specification of the building blocks of the sys-
tem for speech sounds, the lexical building blocks, the
combinatorial machinery of syntax and semantics, etcet-
era. The second requirement is a detailed characteriza-
tion of the neural infrastructure at multiple levels. Mini-
mally this entails detailed information about
cytoarchitectonic, myeloarchitectonic and receptorarch-
itectonic properties of brain areas [3], fiber pathways,
large scale network properties, neurophysiological mech-
anisms (e.g. brain oscillations in different frequency
bands), the computational properties of the columnar
organization of the six-layered neocortex [4], the laminar
organization of feedforward and feedback connections
[5], the temporo-spatial patterns of brain activation [6],
etcetera. Finally, one needs to take a stance on the
mapping relation between the cognitive architecture
and the neural architecture [7]. For instance, at what
level of granularity should one seek the natural kind
relations between brain and language. This could go
from ‘Neuron X + Y represent the final consonant in the
word CAT’, to ‘creating a situational model is based on
the contribution of the right frontal cortex’, all the way
up to the textbook wisdom that ‘language is subserved
by the left hemisphere’. All these issues are complex and
keep many researchers busy in their daily research life.
In my reading of the literature, evolutionary consider-
ations do not play a role (or only minimally so) in
answering these issues on the to-do list of the average
cognitive neuroscientist.
One reason that evolutionary considerations do not play a
central role in the neurobiology of language is undoubt-
edly that for higher cognitive functions the evidence is
not straightforward, and hence many accounts have the
characteristic of just-so stories [8]. Of course, this does not
invalidate the relevance of Tinbergen’s four questions:
the proximate causes (mechanism and ontogeny), and the
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ultimate causes (adaptive value and phylogeny) [9]. How-
ever, in order to stand a chance of making progress on the
evolutionary question (the ultimate causes), we might
need to take a stance on which features of the neural
machinery and its ontogeny (the proximal causes) are
considered to be more key than others for the search of
evolutionary precursors. In the remainder I will illustrate
this for the endo-phenotype, namely the anatomy of the
human brain (all features of the brain are equal but some
are more equal than others).
The neuroanatomical stance
A prime example of the contribution of neuroanatomy is
the famous map by Korbinian Brodmann (1869–1918).
This map consisted originally of 52 different areas,
usually referred to by expressions such as BA 44 for
Brodmann Area 44. The numbers of the Brodmann Areas
were determined by the order in which Brodmann went
through the brain, analysing one area after the other.
Brodmann’s classification is based on the cytoarchitec-
tonics of the brain, which refers to the structure, form,
and position of the cells in the six layers of the cortex.
Quantification was done by Brodmann on post-mortem
brains. These were sectioned into slices of 5–10 mm
thickness that underwent Nissl-staining and were then
inspected under the microscope. In this way the distri-
bution of different cell types across cortical layers and
brain areas could be determined. Even today
Brodmann’s map, that was published in 1909, is seen
as a hallmark in the history of neuroscience. Brodmann’s
work reveals that the composition of the six cortical
layers, in terms of cell types, varies across the brain.
Also cell numbers can vary. The primary visual cortex,
for instance, has about twice as many neurons per cortical
column as other brain areas [10].
The classical view among neuroanatomists is that these
architectural differences in brain structure are indica-
tive of functional differences, and, conversely, that
functional differences demand differences in architec-
ture [11–14]. Following the classical view, through
different ways of characterizing brain structure (i.e.
cytoarchitectonics, myeloarchitectonics and receptor-
architectonics; [15,3]), brain areas can be identified
for which differences in structural characteristics imply
functional differences. From this view it follows that
one should thus look for the structural features that
determine why a particular brain area can support, for
instance, morphological decomposition or syntactic
encoding.
In contrast to the classical view in neuroanatomy, more
recent accounts have argued that from a computational
perspective different brain areas are very similar. For
instance, Douglas and Martin [16] argue that ‘the same
basic laminar and tangential organization of the excit-
atory neurons of the neocortex, the spiny neurons, is
evident wherever it has been sought. The inhibitory
neurons similarly show a characteristic morphology and
patterns of connections throughout the cortex ( . . . ) all
things considered, many crucial aspects of morphology,
laminar distribution, and synaptic targets are very well
conserved between areas and between species.’ (p. 439;
see also [17]). Bastos et al. [4] therefore speak of a
canonical microcircuit that has the same computational
organization across all of neocortex, despite the cytoarch-
itectonic differences that can be observed between, for
instance, sensory and motor cortex. Functional differ-
ences between brain areas are in this perspective mainly
due to variability of the input signals in forming func-
tional specializations. The functional contribution of a
particular piece of cortex might thus primarily not be
determined by heterogeneity of brain tissue, but rather
by the way in which its functional characteristics are
shaped by the input.
Neuroimaging studies provide support for this view. A
number of remarkable forms of neural plasticity have
been reported in recent years. For instance, Amedi et al.
[18] report that they found in congenitally blind subjects
increased activation in primary visual cortex (V1) during
a verbal memory task. Moreover, the stronger the acti-
vation in V1, the better the memory performance. If the
structural properties of V1 had been decisive for its
functional capacities, then it would be hard to see
how the same neurons that in seeing people support
vision could be recruited in the blind for verbal memory.
Bedny et al. [19] report language processing in the
occipital cortex of congenitally blind individuals. This
even includes high-level language function such as the
computation of sentence-level combinatorial structure.
These findings demonstrate that the cytoarchitectonic
constraints for specifications of cognitive function are
rather loose. Presumably, the input and the patterns of
connectivity between areas are a more relevant func-
tional parameter than the differences between the
cytoarchitectonic details of different cortical areas. Bola
et al. [20] report that in deaf humans the high-level
auditory cortex gets involved in vision. Hence, Bedny
[21] concludes that ‘human cortices are cognitively
pluripotent, that is, capable of assuming a wide range
of cognitive functions. Specialization is driven by input
during development, which is constrained by connectiv-
ity and experience.’ (p. 637).
All this does not imply that I deny the great importance of
cytoarchitectonic structures for human cognition. Clearly,
without these basic building blocks of the brain, cognition
would not be possible. Without different types of neu-
rons, glia, and axons, the cognitive machinery would not
work. However, the issue here is that these building
blocks enter into processes of functional specialisation.
My claim is that the exact nature of these functional
specialisations are more easily inferred from an analysis of
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input/output and connectivity than by looking at the
detailed cytoarchitectonic characteristics.
The conundrum that remains for this view is what to do
with the concept of a brain area. How should one define
borders independently of cytoarchitecture? One solution
is to specify brain areas themselves in functional instead
of structural terms. An example is parcellations based on
resting-state fMRI (e.g. [22]; see [23] for an overview).
Alternative options are a parcellation of cerebral cortex on
the basis of a combination of structural and functional
measures [24]. Connectivity-based parcellations are
based on the assumption of a correspondence between
a cortical brain area and its connectivity fingerprint, as
derived by diffusion magnetic resonance imaging (dMRI)
and resting state fMRI [23]. Recent work suggests that
areas of interest might be characterized by multiple
modes of organization, with anatomical gradients of con-
nectivity [25], further complicating the concept of a brain
area.
What are the consequences for accounts of language
learning and language processing? I do not think that
at the moment there is much evidence for the claim that
much hinges on whether a particular activation is found
in, say, BA 44 rather than BA 45. An approach based on
reversed inferences from structural anatomy to cognitive
function seems, in the light of our current knowledge, not
well-constrained enough. It is functional anatomy that
counts, and that might provide stronger constraints than
structural anatomy for specifications of the different forms
of human cognition. This implies that for an evolutionary
perspective on the neurobiology of language we should
look at patterns of associations and dissociations in mea-
sures of brain activity, and do comparative studies of
tractography in different species (e.g. [26]). The differ-
ences in the arrangements of network elements in the
nervous system among related species might be key to
understanding the evolutionary origins of language and
other cognitive functions [27]. The network topologies
might provide more direct insights into the neural instan-
tiations of cognitive functions than the classical anatomi-
cal measures [28]. In the words of Park and Friston [29],
‘Function may deviate from structure to exhibit dynamic
and contextualized behavior. Such divergence of function
from structure is perhaps the most intriguing property of
the brain’. From an evolutionary perspective the func-
tional stance seems to be the most important one.
Conclusion
A cognitive neuroscience approach to language takes
information and constraints from different levels of anal-
ysis into consideration, in the service of a full account of
the neurobiology of language. The assumption hereby is
that different levels can be connected in a transparent
way. At the same time not all constraints have the same
force. Here it is argued that the constraints provided by
the classical anatomical measures (cytoarchitectonics and
myeloarchitectonics) are in our current understanding
only very loose constraints on the detailed specifications
of cognitive functions, including language learning and
language processing. However, measures of the compu-
tational features of brain tissue might provide stronger
constraints. To understand cognitive specialization, for
the time being we thus have to place our bets on measures
of functional instead of structural neuroanatomy. The
implication for an evolutionary stance on the neurobiol-
ogy of language is that in a cross-species comparative
perspective one needs to identify the factors that gave rise
to the properties of the canonical microcircuits in the
neocortex, and to the large scale network organization
that created the language-readiness of the human brain. I
fully admit that my choice of the key features of the endo-
phenotype might be wrong. However, I am convinced
that one needs to take a stance regarding the levels of the
processing architecture of language and brain, as well as
on their mapping relations. Only then we will stand a
remote chance that one day we can answer questions
about the evolutionary origins of language.
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